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INTRODUCTION
This study examines state reform policy and popular township 
response from 1976 to 1987 in Alexandra, a black township 
bordering Johannesburg and Sandton's richest white suburbs.
Reform, resistance and repression have become bywords of South 
African political terrain. Their simplicity describes broad 
parameters of state activity. But often these elements are 
juxtaposed as distinct areas of research so evading the 
complexity arising from the interaction between state policy and 
popular reaction.
The general political, economic and ideological crisis which 
emerged in South Africa in the mid-1970s had particular 
repercussions in the urban realm. Apartheid state intervention 
regulated control and allocation of labour through influx control 
and restricted provision of housing and infrastructural 
services. By the end of the 1970s influx control had proved 
inefficient and incompatible with the demands of capital for a 
settled, skilled labour force. Lack of housing and 
infrastructure had reached crisis proportions. Rapid 
unionisation from 1973 followed by the 1976 uprising demonstrated 
the government’s economic and political tightrope. Administration
boards' attempts to right the crisis, or even maintain their 
management and control -functions, were her lered by a growing 
•fiscal crisis.
Against the backdrop of the urban crisis, three shifts in the 
relation between state reform and township reaction can be 
iden :ified.
The first phase corresponds with the 1979 Riekert Commission, the 
first coherent state reformist strategy to counter urban crisis. 
It hoped to solve influx control problems by recognising the 
existence of a permanent urban population and creating a clear 
divide between 'insiders' and 'outsiders’. Insider’s privileges 
arose from relaxation of influx control, participation in local 
government and access to homeownership through 99-year 
leasehold. It stressed the necessity of creating a black 
middle-class as a political stabiliser. The housing shortage, 
Riekert suggested, could be resolved by lifting the prohibition 
on urban family residential accommodation and shifting the 
responsibility for financing and constructing homes from the 
state to the employer and the individual. Solution to the fiscal 
crisis, he proposed, lay in making local government economically 
self-sufficient by increasing rent and service tariffs to 
economic levels.
This general strategy, still premised on separation between white 
Routh Africa and bantustans, was applied nationally. But not all 
the recommendations came to fruition. Influx control adaptations 
were never legislated, and administration boards resorted to 
bureaucratic delays and blockages to hinder implementation of new 
policies. Community and town council elections were 
characterised by low polls. Township civics and national 
political organisations criticised the councils for their 
powerlessness and lack of legitimacy. Local government’s policy 
of financial self-sufficiency proved a catalyst to township 
political organisation. Dramatic rent increases were an extra 
burden a recession-pressed working class could ill afford. Civic 
organisations mobilised residents against the increases. Though 
they denied councils’ legitimacy, they were willing to bargain 
and negotiate with councillors. But their overtures and demands 
usually fell on deaf ears. Residents felt they were paying more 
for ever worsening township conditions.
As the crisis deepened and councils and administration boards 
maintained their unsympathetic stance, popular organisation began 
to assume an increasingly radical tone and intent. This marks 
the second phase. It culminated in a period of ungovernability 
between 1983 and 1986. The council system collapsed and 
counci 1101 s were hounded out of townships. In its place, 
activists created 'organs of people’s power’ - street committees 
and people’s courts. They were no longer concerned with solving 
local grievances but with establishing embryonic revolutionary
popular power. Born on the terrain of violent conflict with the 
ata<.eF people's power was never able to consolidate itself by 
building a politically educated and democratic base. Open 
resistance was crushed as the South African Defence Force invaded 
townships, arrested cadres and the government declared a national 
state of emergency.
By 1986 the state faced an urban crisis of similar dimensions but 
greater magnitude compared to 1976. Influx control had failed to 
stem the tide of workseekers. The effect of the housing shortage 
wan demonstrated by growing shack settlements. Black local 
government was financially and politically bankrupt. Intensified 
crisis sets the tone for the third phases the state’s reappraisal 
of urban management strategy when resistance had been crushed.
This reappraisal does not signify a return to the premises of the 
Riekert Commission. The 1985 President’s Council report on 
urbanisation strategy views South Africa and bantustans in 
regional, functionally-integrated terms. Insider/outsider 
strategy has been replaced by subtle differentiation between 
metropolitan township populations and within such populations 
through fiscal policy and differing standarus of accommodation 
and infrastructure. Homeownership is now more broadly and 
cheaply available.
Regional Services Councils (RSCs) were established as a means to 
overcome the fiscal and infrastructural crisis. They are reliant 
on business levies to finance township infrastructure. Black 
local authoi it*es serve on RSCs. Multi-racial local government 
is highly centralised to insulate it from popular protest. The 
introduction of Joint Management Centres (JMCs) signifies the 
militarisation of state bureaucracy. JMCs are the grassroots 
level of the National Security Management System and linked to 
state administration at local and regional levels. They 
represent a new bureaucracy, within the reformist fold, and far 
more responsive to township grievances. The state seems to have 
targetted particular townships as serious security problems and 
instituted upgrading programmes which follow the dictates of the 
new urbanisation strategy, are financed by RSCs and administered 
by"JMCs. The intention is to accommodate legitimate grievances 
about living conditions, and so defuse the foundations of radical 
protest. Open resistance has all but collapsed while the state 
redefines the political and social terrain.
Transformations in state policy and popular reaction are traced 
through their application and development in Alexandra.
Chapter one examines the legacy of apartheid in Alexandra. In 
the 1960s the government decided to convert the freehold township 
into a hostel city. Residents' homes were expropriated and 
demolished. Families were removed to other townships. But 
growing political pressure and state financial constraints,
linked to the general urban crisis, -forced the state to 
reconsider its policy. As a result Alexandra was reprieved and
rezoned as a family township in 1979.
The second chapter describes the urban crisis and reformist
solutions put forward by the Riekert Commission on a national
level.
Chapter three examines problems arising from implementation of a 
a masterplan, drawn up in 1980, to redevelop Alexandra as a model 
insider’s township. The constraints of working through local 
government also led to the demise of the party which had 
spearheaded protest to Alexandra’s demolition in the 1970s. A 
working class, grassroots-oriented civic organised residents’ 
resistance to dramatic rent increases.
The fourth chapter reviews the transition to radical mass 
politics, ungovernability and the creation of people’s power. By 
1985, the civic, which was willing to bargain with the council, 
had been superceded by a radical youth movement which denied any 
legitimacy to the town council.
I conclude in chapter five by prooing the relation between a new 
strategy for urbanisation, as evidenced in an updated urban 
renewal programme for Alexandra, and the militarisation of the 
local state through the intervention of Joint Management Centres.
Sources consulted include a range of documentary evidence. 
C r ’.mercial newspaper clippings, the Alexandra town council 
newspaper, recent Bureau for Information newsletters distributed 
among Alexandra residents, and West Rand Administration Board 
letters, meeting minutes end internal memos proved a mine of 
information about implementation of state policy and state 
ideological offensive. Secondary sources and government 
commissions offered a national perspective for the same period.
It is more difficult to trace the activities and motivation of 
popular organisations. Their campaigns and policy statements are 
infrequently and confusingly reported in commercial papers. And 
their history is often lost to personal memory which rewrites the 
past to justify the future. Of course, popular newspapers, 
bulletins and pamphlets are helpful, when they can be found, and 
state court indictments also help flesh out a story. But 
otherwise I have relied on interviews with Alexandra activists. 
This too was hindered for political reasons: key cadre, 
particularly those who were active in 1985 and 1986 are either 
facing trial for treason, in detention, in exile or died in 
Alexandra's uprising in early 1986. It is difficult to trace 
people and given the state of emergency, one can only hope for a 
limited insight into the events of the past few years.
CHAPTER li FROM FREEHOLD TO HOSTEL CITY
In 1963 the government decided to raze freehold Alexandra to the 
ground and rebuild a hostel city for urban workers. Residents 
were expropriated, and their homes were demolished. They were 
moved to other townships or dumped in bantustans. During the 
1970s the plan began to lag. Financial restrictions limited 
hostel development.
On 7 May 1979 during the Department of Plural Relations and 
Development's budget vote, the Deputy-Minister announced, quite 
unexpectedly
* In the future Alexandra will be replanned for the 
accommodation of landowners and other qualified families in 
Alexandra ... We found that th&re was no alternative.
Soweto cannot take those people and neither can Tembisa’
(1).
The reprieve marked a turning point for Alexandra as government 
reformists took charge of its future. Behind this change in 
heart was the recognition that the hostel city was unrealisablei 
the plan had been dogged by financial constraints, delayed hostel 
construction and popular political pressure.
1 , 1  The Freehold Legacy
Alexandra was established as a Native Township with freehold land 
title in 1912. As existing townships were exempt from the 
provisions of the 1913 Native Land Act, the access to freehold 
and relative lack of administrative and influx controls made the 
township peculiarly attractive to urban workers and workseekers 
(2).
Yet this was also the source of its appalling poverty-stricken 
and overcrowded living conditions. Alexandra was in township 
idiom, 'Nobody’s Baby’. Since it lay 2,5km outside 
Johannesburg’s municipal boundary, the municipality refused to 
acCept responsibility for township administration or 
infrastructure. And lacking statutory power and finance, the 
nominated Health Committee could never progress towards 
partly-elected town council or municipal status. The township 
was wracked Liy gangster wars, manipulated by racketeering 
landlords, notorious for a belligerent political culture and a 
health hazard. Alexandra was particularly well-known for its 
anti—pass campaign of 1943—6, the 1954 bantu education boycott, 
and the battle cry 'Asikwelwa' - 'we will not ride’ - was borne 
in the bus boycotts of 1940, 1942, 1943, 1944, and 1957.
Expanding white residential areas wanted the eyesore slum 
removed. But municipal attempts to do so in 1939, 1943 and 195r'
all failed (3).
The Mentz Regional Planning Committee, which formalised plans for 
establishing Soweto, recommended in 1952 that Alexandra remain as 
a labour pool for Johannesburg’s northern suburbs. The 
township’s presence would be tolerated on condition that its 
population be reduced to 30 000 people, and buffer areas be
created to separate it from white areas. This was accepted. By
1958 the Peri-Urban Health Board had assumed control of the 
township. With a government loan of R200 000, granted the 
previous year, it intended to remove residents who worked in 
areas other than the northern suburbs, end unlawful influx, 
impose higher local taxes and purchase freehold titles (4).
The physical, moral and political 'clean up’ of Alexandra now 
began in earnest. After conducting a census, the Board 
introduced a permit system to control residence in the township 
and non—qualifiers were resettled, initially quite willingly, in 
lieadowlands and Diepkloof. The census pinned the population at
07 000, of which 60 000 were expected to move to Meadowlands 
where the Native Resettlement Board planned to build 6 000 to
8 000 houses a year (5).
By the end of I960 the Board had resettled 25 000 people and 
bought 99 properties (6). Two years later the tally stood at 44 
196 removals and 337 property purchases. Construction began on 
sewerage, drain and sanitation facilities, a clinic and 
improvements to the lighting and electricity supply (7).
The redevelopment was short-lived. Alexandra's demise was 
announced by the Minister of Bantu Administration and Development 
on 25 March 1963. In its place would rise a hostel city for 
20 000 single african men and women. Families would be resettled 
in Temoisa, Diepklonf and Meadowlands. Freehold would gradually 
disappear through voluntary sale of prooerty (8).
Almost immediately afterwards, the debate on the Better 
Administration of Designated Areas Bill began. In the name of 
’development’, the bill sought to extend apartheid laws from 
controlled to freehold townships. This would facilitate 
resettlement, relocation and destroying remaining freehold 
rights. The provisions were to be applied to Alexandra 
immediately and later to other areas. Explained one National 
Party MP
’this legislation aims at proper control and administration 
of areas such as Alexandra. If the government does not 
intervene in controlling areas such as Alexandra ciaos will 
develop there’ (9).
The bill was passed in February 1964.
1.2 Creating a Hostel City
Local developments in Alexandra reflected national changes in 
urbanisation strategy as apartheid policy was introduced (10). 
Rezoning Alexandra for hostel accommodation and expropriation of 
freehold rights was in line with government policy which viewed 
afrleans as temporary sojourners in white towns.
The 1947 Sauer Report, the framework for subsequent Nationalist 
policy, had recommended freezing the number of 'detribalised 
natives' in towns while reserving their preferential access to 
urban jobs. In the long term, they were to be regarded as 
visitors who temporarily offered their services. Africans would 
only be officially accommodated in cities if employment was 
available. Bantustans were now their primary place of residence, 
employment and political expression.
From the 1960s even permanent urban residence rights were 
attacked through mass removals and intensified influx control 
over women and children. Migrant labour was rapidly 
proletarianised and long distance commuting began to replace 
temporary migration from rural to urban areas. Bantustans became 
dumping grounds for surplus population.
IB
Urbanisation policy was implemented by primarily coercive 
measures: pass laws, labour bureaux, and -forced resettlement from 
"black spots’. Housing and land allocation were tools to control 
those with rights to remain in white areas and implement influx 
control.
Within cities, the government razcti squatter camps, removed 
freehold areas such as Sophiatown and Martindale (though it was 
ultimately less successful in Alexandra’s case), and relocated 
peopls to controlled townships where the level of political 
activity and influx could be more easily monitored. Formal 
township establishment was a means to siphon out illegal 
residents and relocate sections of the urban african population 
at a greater distance from white urban areas.
The pciicy favoured white farm owners, who couid now draw from a 
wider labour pool; the urban white working class, which was 
protected from competition with black workers; and sections of 
business profited from cheap migrant labour or exploited the 
insecurity of illegal workers.
By the end of August 9 139 Alexandra families had been resettled 
in Diepkloof and Meadowlands and 924 properties purchased. Two 
years later the Bantu Administration manager of the Peri-Urban 
Board announced that since 1959 it had removed 10 000 families
and bought 1 145 properties (11). The rationale behind the 
construction of a hostel city was clearly explained by the 
chairman of the Peri-Urban Board, Coen Kotze:
’The non-productive families are of no use on the labour 
market and they can live just as well, in fact cheaper in 
the homelands, as they do in the white areas’ (12).
The Board planned that demolition or hausing and construction of
eight hostels would be complete by 197c. But by 1970 the Board 
had permission to build only one male and one female hostel and 
still sought approval for a further four male hostels (13). The 
first hostel was only finished in 1971 and the third ten years 
later (14).
The Peri-Urban Board’s plans were reconsidered in early 1972 by a
new planning committee led by the Manager of Bantu
Administration. The committee suggested replanning Alexandra to 
accommodate 60 000 single people (of which 10 000 would be 
female) in 25 hostels. Accommodation would be allocated 
according to employer categories: domestic workers in flats were 
awarded 207. of the space and commercial and industrial workers 
would occupy the remainder <15-. The committee promised.
'The whole town will consist only of such hostels. There 
will be no houses and also no families' (16).
Each hostel would house 2 500 people but be divided into sections 
of 100 to 150 people (17) separated by electrically operated 
steel doors to prevent unrest spreading and 'for the protection 
of the inmates themselves' (18). Rooms would be provided with a 
bed, mattress and cupboard, but no central heating or electricity 
outlets. Inhabitants would share 112 washing tubs and 32 
electricicy points, one bath for every 25 residents, one shower 
for every 35, one hand basin and toilet for every 20 and, in the 
kitchen, one gas burner for every five people. Each hostel would 
have 40 single rooms, 98 double rooms and 412 four-bed rooms 
(19) .
The committee was concerned that hostel lifestyle would break 
down ’family and ethnic' ties which created stability in a 
community. To compensate, some members suggested dividing 
hostels along ethnic lines, decorating the buildings with ’bantu 
motifs' and giving them ’bantu names' (20). Other more pragmatic 
minded members argued that ethnic identity was not quite so 
•ignificanti people should be housed according to work areas to 
facilitate transportation (21).
To the planning committee, a town of single people suggested 
vistas of unsavoury leisure activities. While the women's 
hostels could be situated some distance from the men's (22), the 
committee stressed time and time again the necessity for ’active 
participation in healthy creative activities by the residents' 
(23) in their leisure time. It recommended provision of
grandiose social facilities for hostel dwellers: 37 soccer fields 
for 450 teams| three swimming pools, 16 tennis courts, 
facilities for weightlifting, boxing, choir and first aid 
training classes (especially for women), an amphitheatre, sports 
stadium, cinema, dance areas in each hostel and an 18-hole golf 
course.
1,3 The Dream Begins to Fade
1.3.1 Logistical problems
The population of Alexandra had been reduced to 40 000 by 1973. 
The Board had resettled 56 574 people consisting of 10 685
families and 38 000 single people in Soweto and 15 089 people
including 2 668 families in Tembisa. It had demolished 396 
houses but another 2 100 stood awaiting destruction. Only 950 
properties still remained in residents’ hands (24).
Resettlement continued but more slowly. Population dropped to 
35 695 by 1977 and lived predom' .ately in family housing.
Hostels accommodated 6 767 men and women compared to 28 928 men, 
women and children in family housing (25).
Resettlement was the excuse the Board needed to weed out people 
in urban areas without requisite section 10 rights which 
determined the right of an african to reside and work in ’white' 
South Africa. Only where both husband and wife had section 10 
rights, could they qualify for family housing in Soweto or 
Tembisa. The remainder were sent back to the bantustans (26).
The Black Sash alleged that husbands and wives were issued with 
single permits to prevent them from applying for family housing 
and officials often refused to put children's names on their 
mothers' permits (27). Kotze put the matter clearly:
’We are giving them the choice: they must send their 
children back to the homelands and move into the hostels or 
they must go back to the homelands themselves. This is the 
policy and we will enforce it' (28).
Officials warned that from 1975 children who were not on their 
parents permits would not be allowed to attend school (29).
Officials be.mn to express serious doubts about the hostel plan. 
The West Rand Administration Board (WRAB) took control of 
township adminstration from 1 July 1973. That month an executive 
WRAB member announced an investigation into future planning of 
Alexandra. Conditions, he said, had changed since the original 
decision to convert Alexandra into hostel town: Soweto and 
Tembisa lacked alternative family housing, funds for removal, 
expropriation and construction were limited, and the scheme had
met with widespread public condemnation. The expansion of 
Sandton and Randburg justified considering provision of family 
housing <30).
The following year, in August, WRAB announced that the completion 
date of the hostel project had been extended by ten years to 
1984, subject to funds being made available by the government. 
Purchasing the remaining 887 freehold titles would cost an 
estimated R6 209 000 (31).
Building a hostel city had proved a costly burden, but 
nevertheless continued in a halting fashion. Again in December 
1977, WRAB announced that all expropriations, evictions and 
removals would cease until March the following year due to lack 
of"finance (32). Pleas for financial aid continued until March
1979.
Similar problems were evident even in the late 1960s, though the 
planning committee had chosen to ignore them. Early in its 
inception, the removal scheme was hampered by a shortage of 
houses in other urban locations. Already in 1961 the Soweto 
waiting list stood at a conservatively estimated 18 000 (33).
The Johannesburg municipal Non-European Affairs Committee 
complained that severe shortage of fund, hindered provision of 
2 000 houses necessary for Soweto's natural population increase. 
It estimated a backlog of 13 000 houses in 1973 <34).
Alexandra itself was overcrowded. Employers whose workers were 
zoned for Alexandra were dissatisfied with the shortage of 
housing for their employees The town manager complained to his 
superior in Pretoria of a waiting list of housing requests from 
employers. He said he had urged employers to erect housing for 
their own employees, but only one had done so. The rest 
expressed little interest in such an undertaking (35). The reply 
was prompti a concentration of 'Bantus' in white areas was not 
'desirable' (36).
Ambitious plans are also expensive. In 1967 when the Peri-Urban 
Board considered building only five hostels, it estimated total 
construction costs at R4 517 625. In addition, services, sh,ps 
and beerhalIs in each hostel were expected to cost R647 300 and 
leisure facilities R510 000. The board hoped to pay for 
construction with loans it sought from the Departments of 
Cnmmunitv Development and Bantu Administration and Development, 
as well as the Levy Fund (37).
The Board intended the hostel city to be financially self- 
sufficient. Thus although rents would be kept low, the loan 
amortisements would be paid from rent collected, the Alexandra 
Bantu Revenue Account and Bantu Beer Account. Monthly rents 
ranged from R4.20 for a person living in an eight-bed room to 
R5.10 for a single room. Each hostel was expected to generate 
R147 219 every year. (38). When two hostels were officially 
opened in July 1972 male residents were charged between R5,40 and
R7,00 d^ f^ ncfiri'y on the size of the room and women R5,00 and R7,50 
every month (39). In 1973 the women's hostel was reportedly 
running at a loss (40).
Buying up and expropriating property was also expensive. The 
purchase of 40 plots for the sites of the first two hostels cost 
RB8 584 in 1967. The same year a further R702 101 was spent on 
purchasing another 217 plots, totalling R790 685. By 31 August 
1967, the Board had already bought up 1 206 plots at a cost of 
R2 909 057 (41).
In early 196? the Board began to express concern at the slowing 
rate of property buyouts. Until then it had only bought from 
those who were 'willing'. Now 'the problem lies with owners who 
refuse’ (42). The Board resorted to expropriation. In June the 
following year it appointed an arbitrator to adjudicate property 
values (43,. By 30 June 1972 the Board had paid out R4 210 044 
for 2 539 plots. It had its eye on another 1 025 (*4).
Financial con.triction did not deter the Board altog.ther. H  it 
could not buy people out their hou.ee, it could .imply force them 
to pay to live there. Toward, the end of December that year,
WRflB hOtified resident, to vacate their prop.rtie. or .tart 
paying rent by January 1975. Residential permit, were 
withdrawn. Tenant, were ordered to pay rent to their new
landlord, WRAB.
gtandholders ignored the January deadline. WRAB tried calling 
owners to their offices and instructing them to sign documents 
acknowledging expropriation. They refused. It tried strong-arm 
tactics, evicting tenants, rehousing them in WRAB-owned rooms, 
and depriving landlords of their income.
1.3.2 Political temperatures rise
WRAB's task was not lade any easier by the graoual groundswel1 in 
political protest. White liberal groups condemned forced 
removals and the destruction of family life on moral grounds.
They warned against social problems which would emerge in a town 
catering only for single people. A Citizens Hostel Action 
Committee formed at a public meeting attended by 1 500 in 1970 
sent a petition to the Minister of Bantu Administration 
protesting against removals and hostel development. He replied 
that only the welfare of Alexandra's inhabitants lay at the heart
of the policy (45).
A liason committee was established by Rev Sam Buti in 1974 to 
save Alexandra (46). It held general meetings and listened to 
complaints about permits, lighting, sanitation, water, schools 
and police raids. Buti says the committee operated initially 
under the aegis of the Nederduitse Gereformeerde Kerk in Afrika, 
of which he was General Secretary. The committee met regular.y
at Buti * s house.
’We preached resistance tactics •first through the church and 
then at the schools. We were trying to get the residents to 
believe that they shouldn't go, that they should stay and 
fight' (47).
The liason committee was able easily to gather residents’ support 
for their demand to redevelop the township as a family 
residential area. 'Renew, Don’t Destroy’ was a chord which 
struck many hearts. The Save Alexandra Party followed an active 
public information policy which probably also accounts for its 
legitimacyI it organised house visits to muster support and used 
loudhailers to announce public meetings <48).
The committee made representations to WRAB and various ministers 
of Bantu Administration and Developmenti MC Botha, his successor 
WA Cruywagen, and Connie Mulder who renamed his kingdom 
Department of Plural Relations. When Piet Koornhof was appointed 
minister of the newly-baptised Department of Cooperation and 
Development, the committee gained a more sympathetic audience.
ButI relates how he was able to establish a mutual understanding, 
.-My mense," he told Dr Koornhof, "praat van 'die erwe van 
on* vadere’ en vra, Hoe mo.t ons verst.an?" The reference - 
in Dutch - to the "inherited land of their fathers" and 
their failure to understand why it should be taken from 
them, struck a chord with Dr Koornhof. So did Sam Buti’s 
plaintive personal plea. "Help us," was all he said’ (49).
This sycophantic story relies somewhat heavily on the passionate 
natures of two great men. The decision to reprieve Alexandra was 
also influenced by the problems of implementing the hostel plan, 
explained above. But probably, the most significant factor was 
the uprising beginning on 16 June 1976 and the grievances i «- 
brought to light.
Violence erupted in Alexandra on 17 June when youths put up 
barricades, lasted until mid-August and then gradually declined 
(50). Youths were particularly active in raids on government 
buildings and liquor outlets, intimidating and assaulting workers 
and stoning buildings, buses and cars. Police were attacked, but 
on one occasion even invited to join the rioters. Thirty-six 
pepple died (51).
The government appointed a one-man commission in June 1976 to 
investigate the causes of the uprising. The commission was led 
by Justice Gillie. His report revealed that many grievances 
centred around the implementation and effects of the government's 
urbanisation policy.
A few witnesses told the Commission th.t rioters attacked 
beerh.lis b.c.us. they had been told that profit, financed 
bantustan development <521. Underlying the attack, was extreme
displeasure with the bantustan programme, -forced removals, influx 
control, loss of citizenship and the urban housing shortage it
entai1ed.
Administration boards which implemented urbanisation policy, 
suffered more damage than any other target group. 114 beer halls, 
74 bottle stores, 124 board buildings, and 222 vehicles were 
destroyed or damaged by fire. The Department of Cooperation and 
Development estimated the Board's total losses at R29 662 870 
(53). Rioters damaged or destroyed four police stations, and 224
police vehicles (54).
Not suprisingly Gillie comments that
•There was so much dissatisfaction with administration 
• bo.r-ds th.t many black ra.ld.nt. «.r. -orkdd up to the point 
where they could easily resort to rioting- 155).
Board, were seen a. -ottices =< depression', -which control so 
=, h „  [the black resident-.) daily actiyitie. and so many 
o« hi. need.- but •l.gi.lates and administer, without consulting 
him- (541. H..1dents resented official, and police for
implementing unpopular laws. They complained about poor and 
non-existent .eryic... and inefficient and rude treatment by 
officials which often verged on racism.
Cillie recognised that the Urban Bantu Councils had not satisfied 
demands for political representation. He concluded that blacks 
wanted to participate *n policy making and in the execution and 
administrative functions of authoritative bodies (57).
Housing was a source of discontent. Long waiting lists, 
overcrowding, illegal squatting, high rentals, lodgers fees for 
children or relatives and lack of services contributed to rising 
frustration. While the Commission did not wish to speculate, it 
took note of the argument of many witnesses that if better class 
housing and middle class suburbs had been allowed to develop, 
•the rioting would not have been so extensive’ (58).
Popular discontent was possibly more severe in Alexandra given 
the decades of official neglect and implementation of the hostel
plan.
1.4 Descent into Crisis
The grievances that came to the fore in the 1976 uprising were f 
manifestation of a deep-seated economic and social ::risis. The 
crisis began as the apartheid boom tailed off in the early 
1970s. Real growth had averaged 5.7% annually in the 1960s, but 
reached negative indices in the first half of 1976 and zero by
1977 (59).
Though the South Afric.n economic crisis coincided with a 
world-wide recession, it also indicated endemic structural 
weaknesses. The transition to monopoly capitalism and resultant 
concentration and centralisation of capital from the 1960s was 
accompanied by an acceleration in the rate of inflation and rise 
in unemployment (60). Increasing mechanisation contributed not 
only to growing structural unemployment, but also required a 
larger pool of semi-skilled and skilleu labour. Bantu education 
had created a labour force without literacy, numeracy and 
technical skills necessary for such work.
The reverse side of the coin, however, was that the growing 
concentration of workers on the factory floor provided ideal 
conditions fo- unionisation. The Durban strikes of 1973 presaged 
militant union activity as the demand for a living wag- took
root.
The 1973 strikes, rapidly growing appeal of black consciousness, 
independence of Angola and Mozambique, and ferment over b m t u  
education contributed to political instability which finally blew
up on 16 June 1976.
WRAB'* reconsideration of the hostel plan in the early 1970's 
coincided with the national elide into crisis. The plan's tardy 
and expensive implementation, and the Board's complaints about 
lack of finance were also manifestations of a specific crisis in 
urban management policy, the subject of the following chapter.
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CHAPTER 2i URBAN CRISIS AND STATE REFORMi 1976-1983
Popular discontent which fed the flames of 1976, and the problems 
WRAB faced in trying to implement the Alexandra hostel plan, were 
manifestations of critical inadequacy in urban policy. Influx 
control, administration board bankruptcy, urban housing shortages 
and black local government structures without credibility were 
central features of the urban management crisis.
Acrimonious debate raged through the late 1970s between 
’verkramptes’ and 'verligtes’ within the Nationalist Party and 
dominant classes over how best to deal with the crisis. The 1978 
Info Scandal ruptured the National Party and opened the way for 
PW Botha and his 'verlig" coterie. Botha represented Afrikaner 
monopoly capital which was increasingly openly aligned with 
diversified 'English' and mining monopoly capital. He was also 
closely aligned to the military having been Minister of Defence
for many years (1).
Both. ,et .bout r.or,.hi.in, c.bin.t, c.ntr.li.ing pow.r, dr.ning 
In •.xp.rt.’ from th. milit.ry and bu.in.M sph.roo and 
con.olid.tin, . power b... beyond the .r.n. of white elector.! 
politic. »nd th. convention.! .t.te .pp.r.tu., "Tot.! Strategy-, 
the belief th.t the genera, crl.i. had to be re.olv.d through 
poiitlcl, ..Cl.l .nd economic reform., rather than the barrel of
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